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Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into 
Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the 
Use of IQ Tests* 
I. AN OVERVIEW 
According to Lloyd A. Dunn, past president of the Council fo1 
Exceptional Children, about sixty to eighty per cent of the students 
in the nation's mentally retarded classes are "children from low 
status backgrounds-including Afro-Americans, American Indians, 
Mexicans, and Puerto Rican Americans; those from non-standard 
English speaking, broken, disorganized and inadequate homes; [and] 
children from other non-middle class environments."1 
His estimate is supported by several empirical studies. In Cali-
fornia, Mexican-American children comprise only thirteen per cent 
of the state's school population, but in 1967, they accounted for almost 
thirty per cent of the special education students.2 Similarly, a recent 
survey of eleven Missouri school districts disclosed that learning 
disability (LD) programs, which are remedial in nature, are pre-
dominantly filled wth white, middle- and upper-class children, while 
educable mentally retarded (EMR) programs, which are compensa-
tory in nature, have disproportionate numbers of black children.3 
Specifically, while white children comprised 96.78 per cent of the 
students in LD classes, in the EMR classes blacks constituted 34.21 
per cent of the enrollment.4 Disproportionate numbers of blacks and 
other minority students in EMR classes seem to be the rule rather 
than the exception. 5 
In most schools, intelligence tests are the sole-or at least the 
predominant-criterion used by officials in labeling students men-
tally retarded and in relegating them to EMR classes.6 There has 
been mounting criticism in educational circles of the use of these 
" Portions of this Comment were prepared for the Institute for the Study of Mental 
Retardation and Related Disabilities, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and are to be published 
by the Institute as part of a larger study under the supervision of Dr. William Rhodes. 
l. Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5, 6 (1968). 
2. J. Mercer, Current Retardation Procedures and the Psychological and Social 
Implications on the Mexican American: A Position Paper 2 (1970) (available on Edu-
cational Resources Information Center (ERIC) microfiche Ed No. 052 848). 
3. Franks, Ethnic and Social Status Characteristics of Children in EMR and LD 
Classes, 37 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 537 (1971). 
4. Id. at 537. 
5. For example, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where blacks constitute only 11.1 per cent 
of the total school enrollment, they presently make up 40 per cent of the city's EMR 
classes. Figures provided by Ruth Zweifler, Ann Arbor Special Education Department, 
Advisory Commission on Special Educational Needs. 
6. See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON, & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW &: EDUCATION OF HAND-
ICAPPED CHILDREN; ISSUES &: RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (1971). 
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standardized intelligence tests as EMR placement determinants 
for minority children. For example, Dr. Henry S. Dyer, former 
vice-president of the Educational Testing Service, feels that IQ 
and grade-equivalent scores are "psychological and statistical mon-
strosities." He also feels that, while both IQ and grade equiva-
lency scores are purported to be based on a representative national 
sampling of students, they actually are not. Test makers fail to 
sample many different kinds of schools, and the sampling upon which 
the "average" is based is frequently biased against blacks because 
test makers do not use data from black schools.7 
This Comment deals with the inadequacies of IQ tests as devices 
for identifying those children who are to be relegated to classes for 
the mentally retarded and with the constitutional ramifications of 
these inadequacies. The present use of standardized tests may violate 
due process and equal protection guarantees. Additionally, certain 
procedural due process requirements, heretofore ignored in this con-
text, may apply to the placement process. 
At the outset certain definitional problems must be examined. 
First, within the field of mental retardation a controversy exists over 
what abilities should be included in a definition of mental retarda-
tion,8 just as there is disagreement over the definition of intelligence 
in general. 0 Second, a controversy revolves around whether it is pos-
sible or necessary to evaluate intellectual factors independently of 
emotional factors. Some psychological theorists, such as L.M. Ter-
man and Maud A. Merrill, have attempted to measure a child's 
optimal intellectual level as independently as possible from his gen-
eral personality adjustment. Their tests, the Stanford-Binet Intelli-
gence Scales, were designed to encourage the test taker to minimize 
his personality handicaps and respond with the best intellectual 
capacity he has developed.10 On the other hand, David Wechsler, 
author of the ·wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), pro-
posed a more global view of intelligence, which includes a somewhat 
greater proportion of what is ordinarily labeled "personality."11 
Third, there remains some disagreement over whether a definition 
of mental retardation should refer to potential ability or to present 
functioning ability. The general agreement seems to be that esti-
7. Telephone conversation with Dr. Henry S. Dyer, June 7, 1973. 
8. H. RODINSON&: N. RODINSON, THE MENTALLY luTARDED CHILD: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 28 (1965). 
9. Id. 
10. Teague, Educational Information, in MENTAL luTARDATION, DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT 53, 56 (D. Poser ed. 1969). 
11. Id. One commentator has pointed out, "These two popular approaches to indi-
vidual intelligence testing differ subtly: for example, speed is a more important factor 
in Wechsler's tests than in the Stanford-Binet, ••• and the child who is cautious 
••• and wants to be certain of his answer may be penalized on the Wechsler scale." 
H. RODINSON &: N. RODINSON, supra note 8, at 28-29. 
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mates of potential ability are subject to serious enor.12 In addition, 
it is now agreed that a useful definition of mental retardation must 
rest upon estimates of the present abilities of the child.13 However, 
those who still define mental retardation as incurable tend to place 
greater emphasis on an estimate of potential growth.14 
These problems of definition are most troublesome in dealing 
with the placement of the educable mentally retarded, since "the 
intellectual handicaps of these children are not so great as to deter-
mine their level of adjustment in every sphere."15 In contrast, in the 
case of severely retarded children, most of whom have neurological 
difficulties, it matters little whether mental retardation is considered 
in terms of capacity to learn, knowledge possessed, social adaptation, 
or personal adjustment, since these children have greatly limited 
capacities in all these areas.16 
From a legal standpoint, however, these controversies need not 
be definitively resolved. First, regardless of what definition of mental 
retardation is employed, the fact remains that tests purporting to 
measure intelligence are being used to a significant degree as a basis 
for the placement of minority group children into EMR classes. 
These tests may have built-in cultural and social biases that could 
result in the discriminatory and unfair placement of minority group 
children into such classes.17 Second, regardless of the theoretical con-
troversy surrounding intelligence and mental retardation, it appears 
that the de facto basis for placing children in EMR classes, as re-
flected in the general practice of those engaged in the placement deci-
sions, is potential ability.18 The remedial (LD) class is designed for 
12. H. ROBINSON &: N. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 29. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 27. 
16. Id. at 27-28. 
17. See notes 22-28 infra and accompanying te.xt. 
18. This proposition is extremely difficult to support by reference to the educational 
literature, not because there exists a great deal of material supporting a contrary view 
-in fact, there appears to be none-but because this proposition has been such a basic 
assumption since EMR classes were first instituted in the United States that the edu-
cational writers have seldom needed to restate it. The comments of at least one writer, 
however, are revealing. He writes: 
The theory behind the homogenous placement of children into a special class and 
the labelling of the class as special, is that the goals of the teacher would be geared 
to not only the group's present functioning, but also each student's potential func-
tioning. This functioning is seen as limited at the retarded level on almost all of 
their special abilites. Only those children who are functionally retarded in the 
present and are expected to be functionally retarded in the future, no matter 
what experiences they have in school, should be candidates for these special classes. 
However, • • . this is not the current practice in many school districts, even 
though the four most commonly used individual intelligence tests are designed to 
indicate present overall functioning ability and also future potential. 
Tuckman, The Placement of Pseudo-Retarded Children in Classes for Mentally Re-
tarded, 7 ACADEMIC THERAPY 165, 165-66 (1971). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-
76a (Supp. 1973). 
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children who have learning disabilities, such as speech defects, read-
ing problems, or the like, that cause them to achieve at a lower level 
than regular children but can be corrected.19 EMR classes, however, 
are designed for children who have the capacity to learn only up to a 
certain undefined point, a point always decidedly lower than the 
corresponding point for regular children.20 This discussion is con-
cerned with only the latter type of class, regardless of its local name. 
The standardized tests used to place children into these classes 
are subject to at least three inadequacies. The first is that the two 
tests most widely used throughout the country21-the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale22 and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Chil-
dren23-do not provide sufficiently meaningful information about 
the learning capability of the minority students tested to permit 
their use in so critical a decision as EMR placement. The Stanford-
Binet test was originally standardized in 1937 by giving the test to 
3,184 subjects, every one of whom was a white, native-born Ameri-
can;24 the revision in 1960 again included only whites.25 Also, 
19. The proposition that the disabilities of LD children can be corrected is 
substantiated by reference to the educational literature. Typical among statements 
found is the following: "A learning disability refers to a retardation, disorder, or de-
layed development in one or more of the processes of speech, language, reading, writing, 
arithmetic, or other school subjects resulting from a psychological handicap caused by 
a possible cerebral dysfunction and/or emotional or behavioral disturbances. It is not 
the result of mental retardation, sensory deprivation, or cultural or instructional fac-
tors." Kirk &: Bateman, Diagnosis and Remediation of Learning Disabilities, 29 Ex.CEP-
TIONAL CHILDREN 73 (1962). See also Bateman, Learning Disabilities-Yesterday, Today 
and Tomorrow, in PROBLEMS AND lssUES IN THE EDUCATION OF Ex.CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 
292 (R. Jones ed. 1971). 
20. See note 18 supra. EMR children are thought to develop at roughly one half 
to three fourths the rate of normal children and usually score between 50 and 75 on 
a standardized intelligence test, where an IQ score of 100 ostensibly indicates average 
intelligence. See G. KIMBLE&: N. GAIU,IEZY, PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 511-12 
(3d ed. 1968). 
21. Teague, supra note 10, at 56-57. 
22. The scale is an intelligence scale designed to cover the levels of mental develop-
ment from age two to adult. Levels are graduated in difficulty. Below the six-year 
mental age level most test items are of the performance (nonverbal) type-for example, 
matching and reproducing figures. From age six to adult, test items become more verbal 
and abstractly based and require skills in verbal reasoning power, word definitions, 
and deductive-inductive reasoning. Standardization of the Binet test has been exten-
sive. See generally L. TERMAN &: M. MERRILL, STANFORD-BINEr INTELLIGENCE SCALE: 
MANUAL FOR THE TIDRD REVISION (1960). 
23. The WISC, like the Stanford-Binet test, is based on the theory that psycho-
metric (intelligence testing) evaluation should provide a measure of general mental 
ability. Generally, the instrument is used to evaluate students between eight and fifteen 
years of age, although the test's lower limits extend below this range. Items are not 
grouped by difficulty level. The WISC's ten subtests are classified as either verbal or 
performance scale tests. Scores are provided for each major classification in addition 
to a total or Full Scale IQ score. Like the Binet, the WISC has been subjected to ex-
tensive research. Standardization procedures have also been extensive. See generally 
D. WECHSLER, 'WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN: MANUAL (1949). 
24. L. TEIU,IAN &: M. l\!ERRILL, supra note 22, at 9. 
25. The 1937 Stanford-Binet was in use 23 years before being replaced by what 
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children were excluded if their father did not live in the home or 
was unemployed.26 In addition to a racial bias, these factors indicate 
a probable economic bias in the standardization, for poor children 
often come from families with absent or unemployed fathers. The 
WISC test is similarly racially suspect in that it was standardized 
by testing 2,200 subjects, all of whom were white.27 
It is important to note that the test score is a statement of how 
an individual student compares with the mean score of the norming 
group; the mean is supposed to reflect an average ability to learn, 
while a score above or below it indicates superior or inferior ability. 
A critical assumption is that the individual tested is fairly com-
parable with the norming group in terms of environmental back-
ground and psychological make-up; to the extent that the individual 
is not comparable, the test score may reflect those differences rather 
than the student's capabilities. Indeed, the creator of the WISC 
clearly perceived the limitations of tests normed only on whites: 
We have eliminated the "colored" v. "white" factor by admitting at 
the outset that our norms cannot be used for the colored population 
of the United States. Though we have tested a large number of 
colored persons, our standardization is based upon white subjects 
only. We omitted the colored population from our first standardiza-
tion because we did not feel that norms derived by mixing the 
populations could be interpreted without special provisos and reser-
vations.28 
Dr. Robert Williams has termed "its racist twin"-the 1960 Form L-M Revision. The 
latter used 4498 subjects in the normative sample, none of whom were black. See 
Williams, From Dehumanization to Black Intellectual Genocide: A Rejoinder, CLINICAL 
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLE'ITER, Fall 1970, at 6. 
26. See L. TERMAN &: M. MERRILL, :MEASURING INTELLIGENCE 13-15 (1937). 
27. D. WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 7. There has been no restandardization. 
28. D. WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT OF .ADULT INTELLIGENCE 107 (1944). 
Additionally, many researchers have written extensively on the biases inherent in 
the IQ tests that should preclude their appropriateness for comparing racial groups. 
For example, Garcia pointed out several biases that are summarized as follows: (1) 
Test items are generally from the school curriculum (reading, writing, and arithmetic) 
and exclude musical, artistic, mechanical, and other abilities. Thus, he concludes that 
the Stanford-Binet is actually a measure of scholastic-performance ability, not general 
intelligence. (2) IQ tests are so tied to school curriculum that after about age 17 raw IQ 
falls gradually, indicating that unless one is in constant contact with school curriculum, 
school-related items become more difficult and scores decline. However, scores of those 
who remain in the academic world increase. (3) Although IQ scores generally decline 
over time, ability to get along in nonacademic social settings often improves. This 
aspect of intelligence is not incorporated into IQ tests. (4) For preschoolers, test items 
relate to ability to recognize toys, items from the home environment which are more 
likely to be found in middle- and upper-class homes. (5) Although there is adequate 
precedent for constructing IQ tests that consider the cultural environment of minority 
group children, such construction has not been done. The precedent for such con• 
struction comes from the following: ·when males and females were shown to perform 
differently on specified subtests-males better on speed and coordination, females 
better on verbal tests-the constructors of the Stanford-Binet and other IQ tests omitted 
any test item that strongly favored one sex and balanced the items that slightly favored 
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The second inadequacy is that environmental, psychological, and 
socioeconomic factors have a significant effect on the test results. 
With respect to environmental factors, a major handicap is that the 
language forms spoken in black and lower-class environments are 
alien to the standard English used in the intelligence tests.29 There 
is also less exposure in these environments to books and other 
educational materials.3° Consequently, both the content and verbal 
style of the test may be foreign to the minority child.31 With respect 
to psychological and socioeconomic factors, disadvantaged children, 
whether black or white, are likely to suffer from low self-esteem and 
lack of self-confidence in the schoolroom setting. Black children are 
often imbued with a sense of worthlessness, inferiority, fear, and 
despair, transmitted to them at an early age by their parents and 
reinforced by experiences in the community.32 
one sex with tl1ose that slightly favored the other. See Garcia, IQ: The Conspiracy, 
6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 40 (1972). 
Research by Jane Mercer of the University of California at Riverside has also 
provided significant evidence of the cultural bias of IQ tests. Her most recent research 
has shown that the relationship between socioeconomic factors and IQ is such that 
by knowing tlie cultural background and socioeconomic status of a child, one can 
predict IQ scores for an average group. Using a sample of more than 1500 children, 
Mercer found specific characteristics tllat were significantly more likely to be present 
in those children who did better on IQ tests. 
She found, for example, tllat black children with tlle highest !Q's came from 
families where the mothers wanted tl1e children to be educated beyond high school, 
the parents were married and homeowners, tllere were fewer than tllree children, and 
other white, middle-class phenomenon were present. After selecting tlie five character-
istics most strongly related to IQ for blacks and another five for chicanos and after 
giving a score to each of the 578 chicano and 339 black children according to tlle 
number of white, middle-class characteristics his family manifested, she found tliat 
tlie more white and middle-class characteristics possessed by tlle family, the higher 
tlle child's IQ. The average black child's IQ, witllout controlling for cultural factors, 
was 90.5; when tlle black child's family matched none or one white, middle-class char-
acteristic, tlie average IQ was 82.7; and when it matched on all five characteristics, tlle 
average IQ was 99.5, tlle national norm. Thus, Mercer concluded tllat when socio-
economic status and cultural background are controlled, tliere are no differences in 
intelligence between the groups. See J. Mercer, Pluralistic Diagnosis in tlle Evaluation 
of Black and Chicano Children: A Procedure for Taking Socio-cultural Variables into 
Account in Clinical Assessment, Paper Presented at American Psychological Association 
Annual Convention, Sept. 3-7, 1971 (available on Educational Resources Information 
Center (ERIC) microfiche Ed No. 055 145). 
29. R. HURLEY, PoVERlY AND MENTAL RETARDATION, A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 80-81 
(1969); F. RIESSMAN, THE CULTURALLY DEPRIVED CHILD 75-79 (1962). 
30. R. HURLEY, supra note 29, at 82-83. 
31. A few sample test questions illustrate tlie problem tllat tlle minority 
and/or lower-class child encounters witll respect to content. The General Information 
Section of tlie 'WISC test, for example, asks "Who wrote Romeo and Juliet?" and 
"What is tlle color of rubies?" The General Comprehension Section asks, "Why is 
it better to pay a bill by check tlian by cash?"-a very difficult question for a child 
whose parents have never had a bank account. The test also asks children to identify 
"C.O.D.," "hieroglyphic," and "Genghis Khan." D. "WECHSLER, supra note 23, at 62-69. 
32. A number of psychological studies provide evidence of tlie low self-esteem of 
blacks. For example, Kennetll B. Clark found tllat black children preferred white dolls 
and rejected black dolls when asked to choose which tliey would like to play witll, 
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Third, many variables in the testing situation may contaminate 
the score. These variables, unrelated to intelligence, depress the 
measured performance of black and lower-class children. For exam-
ple, in contrast to middle-class children, lower-class children will 
tend to be less verbal, more fearful of strangers, less motivated 
toward academic achievement, bilingual, less knowledgeable about 
the world outside their neighborhood, and more likely to attend 
inadequate schools.33 These factors may contribute to a reaction 
knmvn as "test anxiety."34 The disadvantaged child, apprehensive 
about his ability to score well and fearful of what others may see in 
the test score, may react to the testing situation in a self-defeating 
manner: He may become highly nervous, or he may withdraw.35 
Either reaction could lower his test score. The disadvantaged child 
is likely to be under greater psychological stress than a middle-class 
white child in a testing situation, and this stress is likely to affect test 
performance.36 Additionally, a black child may lack rapport with a 
white examiner, a factor that could substantially affect his per-
formance. 37 
As a result of the above factors, there is a high degree of correla-
tion between test scores on the standardized intelligence tests and 
the socioeconomic and racial status of the child.38 The more disad-
which were bad, which were nice, and which were a nice color. Clark &: Clark, Racial 
Identification and Preference in Negro Children in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
551, 557 (2d ed. G. Swanson, T. Newcombe &: E. Hartley 1952). Results of the same 
type have been obtained in a variety of settings. See Asher &: Allen, Racial Preference 
and Social Comparison Processes, 25 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 157 (1969). 
The implications of these findings for the testing situation are illustrated by a 
study showing that the black testees demonstrated a greater lack of self-confidence on 
personality tests than did the whites and that these personality variables correlated 
more highly with intelligence test scores in blacks than in whites. See Roen, Person-
ality and Negro-White Intelligence, 61 J. ABNORMAL &: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 148 (1960). 
Additionally, evidence has revealed that black students do better on tests when they 
expect to be compared to other blacks rather than to whites. See Katz, Roberts &: 
Robinson, Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and Instructions on Digit-
Symbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J- PERSONALITY &: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53 (1965). 
33. See R. HURLEY, supra note 29, at 83-115. 
34. Interview with Dr. William C. Rhodes, Professor of Psychology and Program 
Director, Institute for the Study of Mental Retardation and Related Disabilities, Uni-
versity of Michigan, Feb. 4, 1973. 
35. Id. "Withdrawal" in this situation means the failure to respond to either the 
testing material or the tester. 
36. See G. KIMBLE &: N. GARMEZY, supra note 20, at 558-60. 
37. In a recent study blacks were tested by both black and white examiners. Under 
nonthreatening conditions, in which the test was described as one involving eye-hand 
coordination, blacks worked most efficiently when tested by a white adult. When the 
black subjects, however, were told that the test was one of intellectual ability, per-
formance was markedly lowered when the examiner was white, and it was slightly 
elevated when the examiner was black. Katz, Review of Evidence Relating to Effects 
of Desegregation on the Intellectual Performance of Negroes, 18 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
381 (1964). 
38. Among the studies demonstrating that social class and race both operate as 
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vantaged the child, the lower his test score will be. Race operates in 
the same way. Usually the tests themselves are not constructed to 
allow for these factors, and no appropriate adjustment of the test 
scores is made. 
The inadequacies of the intelligence tests harm the misplaced 
minority child in several ways. One is by damaging the self-image of 
the child. In psychological terms, to identify a child as retarded is to 
relegate him to a mental prison, where the sentence of retardation 
becomes a perpetual, self-fulfilling prophecy, limiting the child's 
capabilities and opportunities. Studies indicate that once labeled and 
committed to classes for the retarded a child will act out the stigma-
tized role of a mentally retarded person; he comes to see himself as 
others see him.39 A second harm resulting from misplacement is due 
to the societal stigma attached to the label "mental retardate."40 
Third, misplacement into EMR classes may deprive a child of a 
factors in lowering over-all test scores are E. BAUGHMAN &: W. DAHLSTROM, NEGRO AND 
WHITE CHILDREN (1968); M. DEUTSCH, THE DISADVANTAGED CHILD (1967); K. Er.Ls, 
A. DAVIS, R. HAVIGHURSI', V. HERRICK &: R. TYLER, INTELLIGENCE AND CULTURAL DIFFER-
ENCES (1951); A. SHUEY, THE TE.STING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (2d ed. 1966); Dreger &: 
Miller, Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States, 
57 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 361 (1960); Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic 
Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUCATIONAL REv. I (1969). 
This evidence is interpreted in a variety of different ways, however. On the one 
end of the spectrum is the idea that, since no type of intelligence test has ever been 
able to eliminate these measured differences, there must indeed be innate differences in 
intelligence between blacks and whites and between social classes. This is the view 
subscribed to by Arthur Jensen, the noted Berkeley psychologist who has written the 
most controversial article published to date on this proposition. See Jensen, supra. In 
this article Jensen concluded that intelligence is attributable primarily to genetics (80 
per cent) and only secondarily to other factors (20 per cent) and that blacks as a 
group are genetically less endowed with intelligence than whites. Other writers support-
ing this view are H. EYSENCK, THE IQ ARGUMENT (1971) and Herrnstein, I.Q., ATLANTIC, 
Sept. 1971, at 43. 
A less harsh interpretation is made by what would probably be a majority of psy-
chologists. This group generally assumes that intelligence tests, when used properly, 
are relatively accurate indicators of the current level of intellectual functioning. Most 
would probably say that racial differences in innate levels of intelligence have not 
been demonstrated and probably do not exist. They would be somewhat more willing 
to say that the differences in functioning level are due either entirely to environmental 
difference or deprivation, or to a combination (in unspecifiable proportions) of envi-
ronment interacting with innate intelligence. See generally E. BAUGHMAN &: W. DAHL-
STROM, supra; Dreger &: Miller, supra. 
Finally, on the other end of the spectrum are those who contend that all measured 
differences in intelligence between social classes and racial groups are due to cultural 
bias in the tests themselves and in the testing situation. See K. ELLS, A. DAVIS, R. 
HAVIGHURST, V. HERRICK &: R. TYLER, supra; J. Mercer, supra note 28; Garcia, supra 
note 28. 
39. See Guskin &: Spicker, Educational Research in Mental Retardation, in 3 -RE-
SEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION, 217, 250-51 (N. Ellis ed. 1968); Meyerowitz, Self-Deroga-
tions in Young Retardates and Special Class Placement, 33 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 443 
(1962). 
40. See S. Guskin, Social Psychologies of .Mental Deficiency, in HANDBOOK OF MEN-
TAL DEFICIENCY 325 (N. Ellis ed. 1963); Clark, Children's Perception of a Special Class 
for Educable .Mentally Retarded Children, 30 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 289 (1964). 
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meaningful educational opportunity41 and its concomitant economic 
and social remunerations.42 As previously discussed, the assumption 
underlying EMR classes is that the students in them can learn only 
up to a certain level. The student is deprived of the educational in-
crement above that level. Additionally, in a curriculum for the men-
tally retarded improperly labeled children may not receive the 
intensive, individualized remedial training needed to eradicate their 
cultural and lingual deficiencies. It should be noted that even if a 
student labeled retarded is left in the regular classroom, harm may 
still occur from the labeling in that the teacher is often aware of his 
label and treats him accordingly.43 
41. Most of the studies on the efficacy of special classes for the mentally retarded 
have found that mentally retarded children in regular classes are superior in academic 
achievement to mentally retarded children in special classes. See, e.g., T. THURSTONE, 
AN EVALUATION OF EDUCATING MENTALLY HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN SPECIAL CLASSES 
AND IN REGULAR GRADES (1959); Elenbogen, A Comparative Study of Some Aspects of 
Academic and Social Adjustment of Two Groups of Mentally Retarded Children in 
Special Classes and in Regular Grades, 17 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS 2496 (1957). This 
suggests that children who are misdiagnosed as mentally retarded and misplaced into 
special classes will also regress educationally. 
This finding has sometimes been attributed to the fact that those children who 
remain in regular classes on waiting lists for special classes are less needy than those 
immediately placed. H. GOLDSTEIN, J. Moss 8: L. JORDAN, THE EFFICACY OF SPECIAL CLASS 
TRAINING ON DEVELOPMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN 105-07 (1965). However, 
with the proliferation of classes and the decline of waiting lists, this finding may have 
less to do with differences in the children and more to do with differences in programs. 
42. A number of studies have been directed at the occupational placement of 
former students of special education classes. These studies reveal that the level of 
unemployment among these subjects is greater than might be expected among workers 
of unselected mentality, and that they tend to be clustered in the semiskilled and 
unskilled employment categories. See Bobroff, Economic Adjustment of 121 Adults, 
Formerly Students in Classes for Mental Retardates, 60 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 525 
(1956). 
43. One team of researchers writes: "One of the most important sources of teach• 
ers' expectations about their pupils' intellectual competence comes from standardized 
tests of intelligence and achievement. Even when the administration of one of these 
tests is more or less appropriate and valid, the results may influence the teacher's 
prophecy about the child's subsequent intellectual performance." R. ROSENTHAL &: 
L. JACOBSEN, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 55 (1968). These same authors, in a study 
they call the Oak School Experiment, established teacher expectations for certain 
randomly selected children. Teachers were told to expect these children to be academic 
"spurters." When compared with a control group the experimental group showed 
significantly greater IQ gains (on Flanagan's Tests of General Ability) and significantly 
greater gains in report-card reading grades. Id. at 61-71. 
The Rosenthal study has been subject to the criticism that it was concerned solely 
with expectations of good performance. See "W'ikoff, Danger: Attacks on Testing Un-
fair, CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLETTER, Fall 1970, at 3. Nevertheless, another 
study dealing with the effect of teacher expectations upon the performance of border-
line children has confirmed the "Rosenthal Effect." Teachers were assigned to tutor 
a child in a specific task. Unknown to the teachers, the children had been randomly 
divided into a "low" or "high" ability group; the assignments had no relation to 
true ability. Teachers receiving a child from the "low" group got a "professional" pro-
file that characterized the child as having a poor academic prognosis due to severe 
cultural disadvantages. Profiles on "high" ability children provided a good prognosis 
in spite of cultural disadvantages. After tutoring individual children in a simple sign• 
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·with respect to deprivation of educational opportunity some 
psychologists and educators argue that a class for the educable men-
tally retarded is merely another type of remedial class in which 
certain children are placed because their present skills in reading, 
abstract reasoning, and the like, are below the norm.44 Likewise, they 
argue that the term "intelligence" test is a misnomer for instruments 
that in actuality are another form of "achievement" tests used to 
separate a broad class of students who, for various reasons, do not 
possess the same measure of skills as the great majority of the chil-
dren tested.45 But evidence to the contrary includes: (I) the fact that 
so-called intelligence tests are used as the basis of placement, rather 
than achievement tests;46 (2) the existence of other classes, where 
the label "mentally retarded" is not applied, for children whose 
present level of functioning is below average;47 (3) state administra-
tive rules that regulate the weight to be given to intelligence tests 
scores in the placement process and state laws that define the term 
"educable mentally retarded" in such a way as to make clear that 
EMR classes are based on estimates of potential intellectual capa-
bility;48 and (4) the fact that the estimated low potential learning 
ability for those enrolled is the premise underlying the existence of 
the EMR class. 40 
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The relatively small number of cases in which courts have dealt 
with the EMR placement of minority children may be attributed to 
several factors. First, the parents of children who are placed into 
EMR classes may generally defer to the professionals who make these 
reading task, teachers estimated the child's intelligence. Significant differences were 
found between the learning task scores of "high" and "low" groups; the scores paral-
leled the teachers' estimates of the participants' intelligence. The children's true IQs 
bore no relationship either to learning scores or to estimates of intelligence. See 
,v, HURDER, OVERVIEW OF REsEARCH AND EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: THE 
U.S.A. IN THE SIXTIES 153-54 (1970). See generally Mazer, Effects of Social-Class Stereo-
typing on Teacher Expectations, 8 PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCHOOLS 373 (1971); Palardy, 
What Teachers Believe-What Children Achieve, 69 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL J. 370 (1969). 
44. See, e.g., Wikoff, supra note 43, at 4. 
45. See, e.g., Milgram, Danger: Chauvinism, Scapegoatism, and Euphemism, CLIN• 
ICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLETIER, Fall 1970, at 2. 
46. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
47. See Garrison &: Hamill, Who Are the Retarded?, 38 Ex.CEPTIONAL CHILDREN 13 
(1971). 
48. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 10-76a (Supp. 1973) defines an educable mentally 
retarded child as "one who at maturity cannot be expected to attain a level of intel-
lectual functioning greater than that commonly expected from a child of twelve years 
of age but who can be expected to attain a level of intellectual functioning greater 
than that of a seven year-old child." Thus, in Connecticut the de jure premise behind 
classes for the educable mentally retarded is low estimated intellectual potential. 
49. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text. 
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decisions. Second, even when presented with a complaint by a 
parent, an attorney may simply not have enough knowledge about 
the structure of intelligence tests and the nature and efficacy of 
classes for the educable mentally retarded, or the time to pursue the 
interdisciplinary studies necessary to educate himself in order to 
determine if his client has a valid claim. Moreover, to present such a 
case effectively requires a large expenditure of funds, which is usually 
beyond the financial resources of the parents of minority children 
and may be prohibitive for an attorney otherwise willing to donate 
his time. 
Third, lawyers are usually aware that historically the courts have 
adopted a hands-off approach toward the teacher-student relation-
ship. 50 They are also aware that courts have adhered to the convic-
tion that educational placement based on the academic abilities of 
children is a matter of administrative discretion best left to school 
officials. 51 Courts, despite their activism in the school integration 
struggle, or perhaps because of it, simply do not want to enthrone 
themselves as "super boards of education," charged with overseeing 
the complex, and often picayune, details of a school's internal opera-
tions. 
Finally, an almost sacred validity is assigned by some educators 
and by society as a whole to gadgetry and paraphernalia that promise 
"scientific" results by "scientific" methods. Although there are edu-
cators who deal professionally with the various IQ tests on a regular 
basis, many school systems permit poorly trained personnel to play 
a substantial role in the labeling and placement of students as 
mentally retarded. 52 Such personnel are inclined to treat test results 
as miraculous "short-cuts" to an othenvise complicated diagnosis. As 
a result, there has been little controversy in local educational com-
munities over the procedures employed and, therefore, little litiga-
tion. 
The first of the few decisions dealing with the use of standardized 
tests and the educational placement of minority children was the 
landmark case of Hobson v. Hansen.53 Judge Skelly Wright found the 
50. Schools have been looked upon as having plenary parental power over pupils 
while they are in school. See, e.g., Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 
(1933); McLean Indep. School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); 
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority To Regulate Student 
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 377-78 
(1969). 
51. See, e.g., Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967); Evans 
v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385, 395 (3d Cir.), application for stay denied, 364 U.S. 802 (1960); 
Miller v. School Dist., 256 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D.S.C. 1966); Jones v. School Bd., 179 
F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1959), affd., 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960). 
52. See Ross, DeYoung & Cohen, Confrontation: Special Education Placement and 
the Law, 378 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5, 6 (1971). 
53. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd. en bane sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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"tracking system" of educational placement in the Washington, D.C., 
public schools violative of the equal protection guarantee implicit 
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.54 The "tracking 
system" was a system of ability grouping in which students were 
placed into "accelerated," "general," or "slow" classes on the basis 
of their performance on standardized achievement tests and scholas-
tic aptitude tests. The achievement tests, unlike the District of 
Columbia aptitude tests or the IQ tests discussed throughout this 
Comment, only purported to measure a student's present level of 
skills in a given academic area; no inferences were made about his 
over-all intellectual capacity. Yet, the court found that both types of 
tests discriminate against black and lower-class children, for a dis-
proportionate number of such children were assigned to lower tracks. 
In reaching his decision, Judge Wright found that "[b]ecause these 
aptitude and achievement tests are standardized primarily on and 
are relevant to a white middle class group of students, they produce 
inaccurate and misleading test scores when given to lower class and 
Negro students."55 The decision was affirmed on appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.56 
Following Hobson, a number of articles dealing with the equal 
protection aspects of the case appeared.57 Several lawsuits relying on 
Hobson were instituted around the nation. Many of these culmi-
nated in out-of-court settlements favorable to the plaintiffs;58 others 
54. 269 F. Supp. at 443, 511. 
55. 269 F. Supp. at 514. 
56. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane). 
57. E.g., Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School 
Board, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1511 (1968); Recent Development, Hobson v. Hansen: The 
De Facto Limits on Judicial Power, 20 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1249 (1968); 32 ALBANY L. REV. 
191 (1967); 53 IOWA L. R.Ev. 1184 (1968); 29 u. PITT. L. R.Ev. 749 (1967). See also Com-
rutnt, Ability Grouping in Public Schools: A Threat to Equal Protection?, I CONN. 
L. R.Ev. 150 (1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence 
Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEo. L.J. 1027 (1973). 
58, Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School DisL, Civil No. 70-394-S (S.D. Cal., 
Aug. 21, 1972), a class action on behalf of black and Mexican-American children, 
alleged racial, cultural, and linguistic bias in IQ tests used for EMR placement. Both 
injunctive and monetary relief were sought. The case was settled on Aug. 21, 1972, 
on terms extremely favorable to plaintiffs; monetary relief, however, was limited to 
nominal damages. 
Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civil No. 
71-435-Phx (D. Ariz., Jan. 25, 1972), a class action filed on behalf of Mexican-Americans 
and Yaqui Indians, alleged that EMR placement on the basis of tests given in English 
to students more accustomed to other languages violated the fourteenth amendment. 
This case was settled out of court with a stipulated agreement on January 25, 1972, 
the terms of which were comparable to those set out in Diana v. State Bd. of 
Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972). 
Diana was a class action on behalf of all Mexican-American children and all 
othen similarly situated who had been placed into EMR classes as a result of 
their scores on the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler intelligence tests. These test were 
written solely in English, while I.he children to whom I.hey were given spoke primarily 
Spanish. After a retesting in their native language, many of the children no longer 
1224 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1212 
are not yet settled.59 The question of whether other courts would 
follow Hobson remained speculative. 
Recently, however, in P. v. Riles,60 a federal district court issued 
a preliminary injunction against the placement of black students 
into EMR classes primarily on the basis of the results of IQ tests if 
such criteria resulted in a racial imbalance in those classes. The 
court found that there was a disproportionate number of blacks in 
the EMR classes,61 that the IQ tests utilized as the primary basis for 
placement, among which was the Stanford-Binet,62 were biased 
tested as retarded. The case was settled without a decision on the merits pursuant to 
a stipulated agreement between the parties, which was adopted by the court as its 
order on Feb. 5, 1970. The agreement included the following concessions to the plain-
tiffs: (1) All children whose primary home language is other than English must be 
tested in both the primary language and in English. (2) Children must be tested 
only with tests or sections of tests that do not depend on such things as vocabulary, 
general information, or other similarly unfair verbal questions. (3) Mexican-American 
and Chinese children already in classes for the mentally retarded must be retested 
in their primary language and reevaluated only in terms of their achievement on 
nonverbal tests or sections of tests. (4) Every school district must submit to the state 
before the next school year a summary of retesting and reevaluation and a plan 
listing special supplemental individual training that would be provided to help each 
student return 1:o the regular school classes. (5) School psychologists must norm a new 
or revised I.Q. test to reflect Mexican-American culture. This test would be normed 
only on California Mexican-Americans, so that Mexican-American children tested 
could be judged only on how they compared to the performance of their peers, not 
to the performance of the population as a whole. (6) School districts that had a suffi-
cient disparity between the percentage of Mexican-American students in regular classes 
and classes for the retarded must submit an explanation. (7) Competent school psychol-
ogists should administer individual intelligence tests in the primary language or seek 
out an interpreter who may be either a psychology trainee or intern or some other 
employee of the school district. The case was recently re-opened to perfect the settle• 
ment. 
Since the time of the settlement, the California Education Code was revised to 
reflect the above stipulations. See CAL. Enuc. CoDE §§ 6902.06-.095 (West Supp. 1973). 
59. Stewart v. Philips, Civil No. 70-1199 F (D. Mass., filed Sept. 14, 1970), was a 
class action on behalf of all black or poor Boston public school students who were 
not mentally retarded but who were misplaced into EMR classes on the basis of their 
scores on standardized intelligence tests, and on behalf of their parents, who were 
denied an opportunity to participate in the placement decision. The complaint alleged 
misclassification and misplacement due to the culture bias of the tests used. This case 
has not yet come to trial, nor has it been settled in the interim. 
Areola v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 160-577 (Orange County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed 
June 7, 1968), also a class action filed on behalf of Mexican-American children, raised 
the same issues as the Diana suit. Although the case has not yet been settled, it 
appears to be moot in light of the recent changes in the California Education Code 
described in note 58 supra. 
See generally A CONTINUING SUMMARY OF PENDING AND COMPLETED LmGATION RE-
GARDING THE EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN (A. Abeson, Director, State-Federal 
Information Clearinghouse for Exceptional Children, ed. Jan. 20, 1973). 
60. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Moses v. Washington Parish School 
Bd., 330 F. Sup!)", 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), affd. per curiam, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.) cert, 
denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (school district cannot assign students in recently deseg• 
regated school to classrooms on basis of ability and achievement tests where the effect 
of tests is to perpetuate segregation within the school). 
61. 343 F. Supp. at UHL 
62. The name of the test used by the school district was furnished by one of the 
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against blacks,63 and, ultimately, that the use of the tests constituted 
a denial of equal protection. 64 
These decisions centered on the equal protection aspect of EMR 
placement. Although this aspect is important, the recent Supreme 
Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez65 limits the application of the equal protection clause in the 
education area. Although the following discussion will include the 
equal protection aspect, the limitations imposed by Rodriguez make 
the due process aspects of EMR placement more significant. 
The Hobson decision, which dealt with the concept of tracking, 
raises questions broader than EMR placement: Is tracking, even 
when the IQ tests used to group children accurately reflect present 
ability, constitutionally or socially unacceptable?66 Are remedial (not 
EMR) classes for minority children constitutionally mandated?67 
This Comment will not discuss these larger issues, but will deal only 
with the placement of minority children into EMR classes on the 
basis of standardized IQ tests. 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A threshold issue is whether courts should involve themselves in 
school board matters at all.68 Recent cases still reflect the historical 
reluctance of courts to act in the areas of school testing, curriculum, 
and student placement.69 The courts are concerned that problems of 
such educational complexity may not be suitable for judicial resolu-
tion. 70 It is clear, however, that where school administrative policy 
affects important constitutional rights, the federal courts, including 
attorneys of record. Telephone interview with Armondo M. Menocal III, San Francisco 
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, March 14, 1973. 
63. 343 F. Supp. at 1313. 
64. 343 F. Supp. at 1314. 
65. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973). 
66. Cf. Moses v. Washington Parish School Bel., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), 
affd. per curiam, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972). 
67. See United States v. Jefferson Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 891 (5th Cir. 1966), 
affd. en bane, 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Montoya, 
Bilingual-Bicultural Education: Making Equal Educational Opportunities Available 
to National Origin Minority Students, 61 GEO. LJ. 991 (1973). But see Lau v. Nichols, 
472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973). 
68. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. 
69. See, e.g., Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967) (pupil 
assignment according to intelligence tests); Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163, 169 
(N.D. Ga.), affd., 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967) (curriculum); Youngblood v. Board of 
Pub, Instruction, 230 F. Supp. 74, 76 (N.D. Fla. 1964) (pupil assignment according to 
intelligence tests). 
70. See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional 
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L REv. 583 (1968); Note, Hobson v. Hansen: 
Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HAB.v. L REv. 1511 (1968). 
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the Supreme Court, will act despite the complexity of the educational 
or administrative problem involved.71 
A. The Use of IQ Tests 
I. Due Process 
Although the state action required by the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment includes action taken by local govern-
mental or quasi-governmental bodies such as school boards,72 at first 
glance misplacement into an EMR class would not appear to deny 
a child the "life, liberty, or property" protected by the due 
process clause. The Supreme Court has, however, defined these terms 
loosely and looked toward the importance of the specific individual 
interest at stake with,out requiring that they be classifiable as either 
"life," "liberty," or "property." Under this approach, the clause 
applies whenever the state deals with an individual, so long as the 
interests threatened are not wholly frivolous.73 
An individual's interest74 in an education has been held to be 
important enough to warrant the protection of the due process 
clause.76 Additionally, the labeling of a child as mentally retarded 
may infringe upon his interest in freedom from "badges of infamy."78 
71. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1968); Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385, 395 (3d Cir.), appli-
cation for stay denied, !164 U.S. 802 (1960); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 852-5!1 (5th Cir. 1966), afjd. en bane, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 
!189 U.S. 840 (1967); United States v. School Dist. 151, !101 F. Supp. 201, 228 (N.D. 
Ill. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 94!1 (1971). CJ. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1970). But cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 
U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973). 
72. See Brown v. Board of Educ., !147 U.S. 48!1 (1954). 
73. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (teacher employment); Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statutes); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 5!15 (1971) 
(drivers' licenses); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 43!1 (1971) (stigma of being 
labeled an excessive drinker); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance 
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment). 
74. The term "interest" seems accurate as there no longer appears to be any vitality 
left in the right-privilege distinction. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 
(1972). 
75. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama 
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !168 U.S. 930 (1961); General 
Order on Judicial Standard of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Disci-
pline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 13!1 (W.D. Mo. 
1968) (en bane). See also Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 35 (1970) (Douglas &: 
Brennan, JJ ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). 
76. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), the Supreme Court, in holding that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to establish guilt in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings where the juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime 
if committed by an adult, stressed the stigma involved: "The requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent 
reasons. The_ accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense 
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon convic-
tion and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction." 
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A fundamental requirement of due process in some circumstances 
is that any evidence used to determine whether adverse state action 
should be taken against an individual must be reasonably related to 
proving the appropriateness of the action.77 In the present context, 
the adverse action is the placement of children into classes for the 
educable mentally retarded. The methods employed to determine 
if this action should be taken are the standardized intelligence tests. 
To the extent that these tests are untrustworthy indicators of mental 
retardation in minority children, their use with respect to these 
children may violate due process. 
There are three lines of cases that support this contention. The 
first relevant body of law deals with the constitutionality of certain 
"identification" procedures. In Foster v. California,78 the use of 
police "lineup" procedures, in which the defendant was exhibited 
to witnesses for identification prior to trial, was challenged. The 
Court concluded that, due to a number of factors in that case, it was 
"all but inevitable" that the robbery victim would identify the 
defendant as the robber, whether or not he was "in fact" guilty.79 
In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated a principle estab-
lished in earlier cases: The conduct of identification procedures must 
not be "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification" as to create a serious likelihood that an 
innocent person could be convicted.80 Such procedures, according to 
the Court's decisions, must be evaluated in light of the totality of 
surrounding circumstances and require consideration of both the 
necessity for the particular procedures used and the chance that they 
might lead to an erroneous identification.81 
The Supreme Court has recognized that even noncriminal stigmas attached to persons 
as a result of governmental action may be sufficiently harmful to call the requirements 
of due process into play. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970) (stigma of 
being labeled an excessive drinker held sufficient to invalidate a state statute allowing 
public posting of names of persons deemed habitually guilty of excessive drinking 
without giving affected persons notice or opportunity to protest inclusion of their 
names on such a list); Cafeteria 8c Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 898 (1961); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (origin of term "badge 
of infamy'); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (1951). 
77. See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 
463 (1943); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
78. 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
79. 394 U.S. at 443. The factors were (1) the defendant was placed in a lineup 
with two other men who were considerably shorter than he; (2) he was the only one 
who wore a jacket similar to the one the witness believed the robber had worn; (3) 
when an initial lineup did not lead to positive identification, the police permitted a 
one-to-one confrontation; and (4) when the witness remained uncertain, some days 
later another lineup was arranged in which the defendant was the only person who 
had also appeared at the first. 394 U.S. at 441-42. 
80. 394 U.S. at 442. 
81. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218 (1967). 
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The second line of cases involves the use of coerced confessions. 
Beginning with Brown v. Mississippi,82 the Supreme Court has held 
that the use of such confessions violates due process. 83 Three factors 
underlie these decisions. The first is the desire to deter improper 
police conduct. 84 The second is the fear that coerced confessions may 
unduly influence the jury.85 The third is a belief that they lack an 
assurance of reliability. 86 
The third line of cases deals with constitutional limitations on 
the creation and effect of certain presumptions. In Tot v. United 
States81 the Court stated the basic tests to be used in determining 
the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in criminal laws. In 
Tot, the defendants were convicted under a provision of the Federal 
Firearms Act88 that made it "unlawful for any person convicted of 
a crime of violence ... to receive any firearm ... which [had] been 
shipped ... in interstate . . . commerce" and further provided that 
"the possession of a firearm ... by any such person [is] presumptive 
evidence that such firearm ... was ... received by such person in vio-
lation of [the] Act."89 In holding that the presumption violated due 
process, the Court stated that "a statutory presumption cannot be 
sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved 
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the jnference of the one from 
proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between 
the two in common experience."90 The Co_urt noted that, although 
state laws might make acquisition difficult, it did not follow from 
proof of mere possession that the firearms must have been received 
by the defendants in interstate, as opposed to intrastate, commerce 
subsequent to the adoption of the federal statute.91 
In a later case, Turner v. United States,92 the Court seems to have 
gone beyond the requirement that the proved fact must tend to 
prove the presumed fact rationally. It seems to have adopted the 
standard that the presumed fact must actually exist beyond a reason-
82. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
83. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 
(1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 
84. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 544 (1961). 
85. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
368, 389 (1964); Comment, Due Process Challenge to an Accomplice's Coerced Con• 
fession, 58 GEO. L.J. 621, 627 (1970). 
86. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 173 (1952); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (dictum). But see Roger& 
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1960). 
87. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
88. Ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250 (1938). 
89. 319 U.S. at 464. 
90. 319 U.S. at 467-68. 
91. 319 U.S. at 468. 
92. 396 U.S. 398 (19'70). 
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able doubt.98 Although the decided cases to date have dealt only with 
statutory presumptions, one noted authority is clearly of the opinion 
that "theoretically due process problems may arise with regard to 
any presumption [upon which the state relies] .... "94 
Undoubtedly, distinctions can be drawn between these three 
lines of cases and the use of culturally and/ or racially biased IQ 
tests in labeling a child mentally retarded and assigning him to a 
mentally retarded class or track. The criminal lineup and confession 
cases involve infringement of greater interests-freedom from physi-
cal incarceration and criminal stigma-than are at stake in the retar-
dation cases. Labeling a child mentally retarded and relegating him 
to a special class or track does not result in physical incarceration, 
except to the extent that he is segregated physically from his mental 
peers in a separate classroom. The Tot group of cases are also dis-
tinguishable from the EMR cases in that they too deal with criminal 
proceedings, although the principle of the Tot group has once been 
applied to a civil presumption.95 
But the stigma attached to mental retardation, which equals or 
exceeds in some cases the stigma of a criminal conviction ( especially 
a conviction for a trivial misdemeanor), the deprivation of a mean-
ingful education and its concomitant rewards, and the irremedial 
psychological damage done to a child by false labeling indicate that 
interests of comparable weight are involved in EMR cases. 
It should not matter, moreover, that due process traditionally has 
required greater procedural safeguards in the criminal context.96 Re-
cent Supreme Court decisions have looked past this antiquated crim-
inal-civil dichotomy to the nature of the interests involved.97 
At least under circumstances similar to those in Foster, Brown, 
and Tot, it is clear that evidence that is the basis of adverse state ac-
tion against an individual must be reasonably related to establishing 
the appropriateness of the action. In the EMR context, if it can be 
demonstrated that IQ scores are the sole or predominant criterion 
utilized in the labeling process, that the decision maker is influenced 
unduly by the scientific aura surrounding IQ tests, and that such 
tests, as administered to poor and minority students, are culturally 
biased, thus labeling some students as mentally retarded who are not 
so in fact, it follows that the use of such tests as indicators of mental 
93. See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 344, at 816 (2d ed. 1972); Christie &: Pye, Pre-
sumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 
923·24. 
94. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 93, § 344, at 811. 
95. Western&: A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929). Doubt has been cast on 
the vitality of this case, however, because of changes in the law of negligence. See 
Fm. R. EVID. 301, Advisory Committee's Note. 
96. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). 
97. See, e.g., cases cited in note 73 supra. 
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retardation is not reasonably related to the proper placement of mi-
nority children. What is unclear, however, is the willingness of courts 
to extend the Foster-Brown-Tot principle beyond its present crimi-
nal context to EMR placement. 
2. Equal Protection 
Under the traditional equal protection standard, a state generally 
retains discretion to classify people so long as the classification bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.98 The state is 
not required to classify people with "mathematical precision,"99 and 
classifications made by the state bear a presumption of validity.100 
However, if the classification infringes upon fundamental rights101 
or is "suspect,"102 it must be tailored precisely to accomplish its pur-
pose,103 less drastic means must not be available to accomplish its ob-
jective,104 and, ultimately, the interests furthered must be justified 
by a compelling interest.105 
The first step in applying the traditional test is to identify the 
classification involved. The criterion purportedly used by school au-
thorities to classify students is learning ability as measured by stan-
dardized intelligence tests. Ostensibly, this criterion separates stu-
dents into only two broad classes: (1) a class of students who possess 
the skills measured by these tests and therefore remain in regular 
classes where they can perform to the best of their abilities; and (2) 
a class of students who do not and cannot possess the skills measured 
by these tests, who are in reality educably mentally retarded, and 
who are placed in special classes where they, like the regular students, 
can perform at their maximum level. However, the criterion, as ap-
plied, appears to create in addition a third broad class of students 
who are black, Indian, chicano, and/ or poor, who, although not 
presently possessing the skills measured by the tests, are capable of 
acquiring them but are nonetheless placed in special classes that are 
not conducive to educating them to perform to the full extent of 
their capabilities. 
Once the affected classes have been identified, under the tradi-
98. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961). 
99. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
100. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911). 
101. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of personal privacy); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote in state elections); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil• 
liamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). 
102. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (ancestry). 
103. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351, 357-58 (1972). 
104. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
105. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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tional equal protection test the question then becomes whether the 
discrimination among the classes is "reasonable." Specifically, the is-
sue is whether placement through the use of standardized intelli-
gence tests is reasonably related to a proper governmental objective. 
It could be argued that the use of IQ tests bears no rational relation-
ship to the placement of minority children because of the defects in 
the tests. This irrationality is twofold: The children are not properly 
tested for placement into regular classes, and they are not properly 
tested for placement into LD rather than EMR classes. If the school 
in question has only one class for abnormal children, it could be 
argued that a refusal to draw a distinction between the LD and EMR 
classes where the circumstances manifestly justify the distinction vio-
lates the equal protection clause.106 
However, a system of ability grouping is rationally related to one 
legitimate state objective-educating those most capable of learning 
-in that the "normal" children are separated from those students 
who, for whatever reason, are unable to maintain the pace of the 
normal curriculum. That the instruments, that is, intelligence tests, 
used to make this division do not further subdivide those students 
who are unable to compete in the normal curriculum into the truly 
mentally retarded and the socio-culturally deprived does not detract 
from the fact that the division accomplished is related to a legitimate 
governmental objective. Thus, it would appear that an attack on the 
placement of minority children into EMR classes under the tradi-
tional equal protection test would be unsuccessful, for under that 
test one reasonable basis for a discriminatory classification is suffi-
cient, regardless of other injurious consequences.107 
There is a possible variation of the traditional test that should 
be discussed. Recent court decisions striking down state require-
ments while voicing the traditional test have cast doubt on the per-
missiveness of the traditional standard.108 Minimal rationality of 
means may no longer be sufficient to justify a classification,109 and a 
106. An analogous principle has been relied on by courts in at least two recent 
cases to strike down criminal statutes grouping marijuana with "hard drugs" for pur-
poses of the imposition of penalties. People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 
(1971); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972). See also Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
107. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
108. State classifications are overturned under this standard only when "no grounds 
can be conceived to justify them." McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 
802, 809 (1969). 
109. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 
504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); 
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J.); Green v. 
Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973) (Feinberg, J.). See generally Gunther, 
Foreword: In Search of E,,olving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). For recent Supreme Court opinions that 
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court may no longer accept just any legitimate purpose.110 However, 
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguezm the Supreme Court, 
upholding the Texas property tax system of financing public educa-
tion, refused to adopt this approach and thus cast doubt upon the 
applicability of these recent decisions to the area of education.112 
There is a second variation of the traditional standard that may 
apply. The district court in P. v. Riles113 explicitly stated that it was 
rejecting that part of the traditional equal protection test that places 
the burden on the plaintiff to prove that no rational relationship ex-
ists between the method of classification used and the outcome of 
the classification.114 The court accepted in its place the plaintiff's 
theory that once a racial imbalance in EMR classes is demonstrated 
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant school authorities to dem-
onstrate the rationality of the mode of classification. The court cited 
cases holding that if a job qualification test excludes a greatly dis-
proportionate number of blacks, the burden shifts to the employer 
to demonstrate that the test is valid for purposes of selecting em-
ployees ;115 that when qualification tests for jury service lead to dis-
proportionately low numbers of blacks on juries, the burden shifts 
to the state to explain why passing such a test indicates that one will 
be an effective juror;116 and that when a school district's methods for 
delineating school boundaries result in student bodies of predomi-
nately one race or another, the burden shifts to the school district to 
demonstrate that its methods serve valid and educationally relevant 
purposes.117 As a rationale for its rejection of the more traditional 
approach to burden of proof, the Riles court stated: 
Insofar as the cases which have shifted the burden of proof rely 
for their support on this general distrust of classifications which 
harm blacks as an identifiable group, then this Court feels compelled 
to shift the burden in the instant case if plaintiffs can demonstrate 
suggest a balancing approach, see Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
110. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451 (1972). See also Rosario v. 
Rockefeller, 41 U.S.L.W. 4401, 4404 (U.S., March 21, 1973) (dictum). 
111. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 1973). 
112. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4424. Justices Marshall, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4437, 4445, and White, 
41 U.S.L.W. at 4427, however, in their dissents disagreed with the Court's rigid 
approach to equal protection. 
113. See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
114. 343 F. Supp. at 1308-09. 
115. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); 
Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal. 
1972). 
116. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(Hufstedler, J.). 
117. 343 F. Supp. at 1309, citing United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 
(N.D. Ill.), affd., 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971). 
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that I.Q. tests are in fact the primary basis for placing students in 
EMR classes and that in fact there is a disproportionately high num-
ber of black students in the EMR classes.118 
The court found that the evidence introduced by plaintiffs estab-
lished the above mentioned facts; it then shifted to the school au-
thorities the burden of proof, which they failed to meet. 
One difficulty with the Riles case lies in the court's failure to con-
sider fully one of three elements of the case that had to be present to 
establish an equal protection violation under the traditional test. 
The three elements were (I) that there was a causal relation be-
tween the use of the tests and the racial imbalances in the EMR 
classes; (2) that the tests were not rationally related to the state pur-
pose for which they were being used, that is, determining the intel-
lectual capacity of black and poor children; and (3) that the use of 
the tests for black and poor children was not rationally related to 
any other legitimate educational purpose. The court failed to con-
sider fully the third element; the administration of the biased IQ 
tests may have been related to one legitimate educational purpose-
specifically, separation of "fast" learners from "slow" learners.119 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Riles court should 
have shifted the burden of proof at all. In Jefferson v. Hackney,120 
blacks and Mexican-Americans brought an action challenging Texas' 
administration of its welfare program. Persons receiving welfare un-
der the category of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
received less than persons receiving aid under other categories, such 
as aid to the aged and aid to the totally disabled. The AFDC program 
was funded at seventy-five per cent of recognized need, while the 
other programs were funded at ninety-five per cent and one hundred 
per cent of recognized need, and there was a larger percentage of 
118. 343 F. Supp. at 1309. The courts in the jury selection cases did not have to 
consider other legitimate governmental objectives that might have been served by the 
qualification tests given to prospective jurors, since there could be no other legitimate 
objective than the selection of competent jurors. This was also true in the employment 
cases. Either an employment test was related to determining if a person would perform 
a particular job competently, or it was not. Nor was there a need to reach the problem 
of other valid government purposes in the desegregation case relied on by the Riles 
court, because in that case-United States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. 
Ill.), aff d., 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), ce1·t. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971)-there had 
been prior intentional racial discrimination in the school district, and the court found 
that present pupil assignment practices were being intentionally utilized to maintain 
that discrimination. 
119. The court did consider the possibility that the IQ tests segregated students 
according to their ability to learn in regular classes; however, it limited its consideration 
to the effects on black children, 343 F. Supp. at 1313-14. It failed to consider 
the possibility that the tests might have separated those students best capable of learn-
ing from those unable to maintain the pace of the normal curriculum regardless of 
whether the latter were black or white. Under tl1e traditional test if this purpose were 
met the classification would be upheld. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra. 
120. ·106 U.S. 535 (1972). 
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blacks and Mexican-Americans in AFDC ( eighty-seven per cent) than 
in the other programs, where whites were sixty per cent and fifty-
three per cent of the recipients.121 Despite the fact that blacks and 
Mexican-Americans overwhelmingly populated the program receiv-
ing the least aid, the Supreme Court applied the traditional equal 
protection test, refused to shift the burden of proof to the state, and 
upheld the practice. 
There are also problems with respect to the more stringent, com-
pelling interest version of the equal protection test. In Hobson v. 
Hansen,122 which held that the "tracking system" used in District of 
Columbia schools violated the equal protection clause, the court in-
dicated that both suspect classifications and a fundamental right were 
involved.123 Since the tests employed were standardized largely on 
white and middle-class persons124 and since they contained language 
forms and vocabularies alien to black and poor students, the court 
concluded that the students were being classified on suspect racial 
and economic grounds, rather than on ability to learn.125 Likewise, 
the court seemed to assume, without lengthy explanation, that equal 
educational opportunity was a fundamental right. 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez126 has ended the long 
debate over the proper equal protection characterization of the in-
terest in education. The Court explicitly found that education was 
not a fundamental right.127 Therefore, if the compelling interest test 
is to be applied, as it was in Hobson, it must be because a suspect 
classification is involved. 
A suspect classification is one the Supreme Court has labeled 
"suspect" and has subjected to the stringent compelling interest 
standard.128 These classifications have been defined by the Court as 
referring to "discrete and insular" minorities.129 To date, only race,130 
ancestry,131 and alienage132 have been found to be "discrete and in-
sular." 
121. 406 U.S. at 548. 
122. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra. 
123. The reasoning of the opinion is criticized in Comment, supra note 57. 
124. Significantly, in the test used in the District of Columbia placement process 
possibly only 60 per cent of the standardized group were white and middle-class. 269 
F. Supp. at 479. 
125. 269 F. Supp. at 514. 
126. 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., Marcli 21, 1973). 
127. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4418. The argument that education is a fundamental right 
may still be viable under state constitutions, however. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 
2d 584, 597 n.11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1972) (state 
constitutional provision as alternative ground). 
128. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967). 
129. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 204 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
130. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
131. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
132. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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The courts may find classification on the basis of IQ tests suspect 
because of the possibility that students are grouped, not according 
to their ability to learn, but according to their racial, social and eco-
nomic status. While all students are given the same tests, a seemingly 
fair procedure, these tests are standardized only as to white, middle-
class students and heavily emphasize verbal skills. Thus, the results 
may be valid indicators of mental retardation only for white, middle-
class students.133 
The difficulty with this argument is that the standardized tests do 
not on their face set apart blacks and the poor for discriminatory 
treatment. The disproportionate effect on blacks, other minorities, 
and the poor is, arguably, merely a by-product of a legitimate system 
of ability grouping. That a governmental program has different im-
pacts on different races or economic groups does not necessarily make 
it constitutionally "suspect." For example, assume that approxi-
mately thirty per cent-or any other percentage larger than that of 
blacks in the U.S.-of the persons arrested nationwide for armed 
robbery are black. This would not make the armed robbery statutes 
"suspect." More directly on point is the school segregation that re-
sults from segregated neighborhoods, a by-product of the effort to 
provide neighborhood schools. Although the Court may soon find 
these de facto school segregation schemes unconstitutional, the issue 
is presently an open one.134 In any case, EMR placement appears to 
be different from either of these two examples. Although both the 
armed robbery statute and the requirement that children attend 
neighborhood schools result in disproportionate numbers of blacks 
and poor being adversely affected, this result does not stem from any 
intrinsic defect in the statute or rule applied. IQ tests, however, are 
intrinsically defective in that they are normed to white children but 
used to measure the abilities of nonwhites. In this sense EMR place-
ment seems more akin to de jure segregation, such as that resulting 
from purposeful exclusion of blacks by gerrymandering school dis-
tricts, than to de facto segregation. Both gerrymandered school dis-
133. See notes 1-49 supra and accompanying text. 
134. Although the Supreme Court has prohibited educational discrimination under 
color of law, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it has never directly 
addressed itself to the problem of de facto segregation. In one recent case an equally 
divided (4•4) Court, without opinion, affirmed a court of appeals decision allowing 
racially segregated schools that resulted from racially segregated neighborhoods. Bradley 
v. Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 41 U.S.L.W. 4685 (U.S., May 21, 1973), affirming 462 F.2d 
1058 (4t11 Cir. 1972). The Court had previously declined to rule on similar schemes. 
E.g., United States v. School Dist. 151, 402 U.S. 943 (1971), denying cert. to 432 F.2d 
1147 (7th Cir. 1970); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 389 U.S. 847 (1967), denying cert. 
to 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); Downs v. Board of Educ., 380 U.S. 914 (1965), denying 
cert. to 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 368 U.S. 940 (1961). 
In its most recent decision on this subject, Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 41 U.S.L.W. 
5002 (U.S., June 21, 1973), the Supreme Court held that the mere assertion of a 
"neighborhood school policy" is insufficient if there is evidence that the school author-
ities "have practiced de jure segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system 
.... " 41 U.S.L.W. at 5008. 
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tricts and EMR placement by the use of IQ tests are specifically de-
signed in ways that affect blacks adversely-that is, discrimination is, 
by definition, a necessary result of the process. Gerrymandered dis-
tricts have been held to be defined improperly;135 it can be argued 
that the EMR groups have similarly been defined improperly. 
A court may also be disposed to consider the classification here 
in question suspect because it involves a group of defenseless victims 
-both poor and young-traditionally favored by the courts.136 How-
ever, the Court in Rodriguez dealt with a classification that adversely 
affected a similar group and did not find it suspect.137 
A third possibility is that the class "mentally retarded" may be 
suspect. Support for this approach can be found in recent decisions 
in which the Supreme Court has held that classifications dealing 
with aliens are suspect138 and in which it has looked closely at the 
classification "illegitimate children."139 (In the latter case, however, 
it is not clear whether a compelling interest analysis or a balancing of 
interests was used.140) The common characteristics of both these clas-
sifications seem to be group stigmatization, a history of discrimina-
tion, political impotence, and ready identifiability. These character-
istics would appear also to apply to the mentally retarded. However, 
the present Court appears to be reluctant to expand the parameters 
of equal protection to include new suspect classifications.141 
If a suspect classification does exist and, therefore, the compelling 
interest standard is used, school boards would fare poorly. Classifica-
tion based primarily on IQ tests lacks the surgical precision required 
by the compelling interest standard.142 Additionally, it is extremely 
135. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (gerrymandered voting 
districts declared unconstitutional because of racially discriminatory effect). 
136. For example, the poor have received favorable judicial treatment in the area 
of criminal law and procedure. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. 
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956). For examples of Supreme Court solicitude toward children, see Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (limitations upon distribution of literature to minors 
more restrictive than rules applied to adults in obscenity cases upheld); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (application to Jehovah's Witnesses of state statute 
providing that no boy under twelve or girl under eighteen can sell periodicals on the 
street held constitutional-immunity from regulation of religious activities subordinated 
to interest of state in protecting children). 
137. 41 U.S.L.W. at 4412-15. 
138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See also Takahashi v. Fish 8: 
Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
139. Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1971); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 
535 (1973). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. 8: 
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
140. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1971); Gomez v. 
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
141. E.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S., March 21, 
1973). See Gunther, supra note 109, at 12-16. 
142. See text accompanying note 103 supra. 
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doubtful whether any of the educational goals for IQ testing es-
poused by school authorities are compelling; few state goals have 
ever met this requirement.143 
B. Procedural Protection for Families of Children 
Placed into EMR Classes 
If, despite the arguments raised above, the use of present-day IQ 
tests is allowed in the labeling-placement decision, students and par-
ents may nevertheless be entitled to some protection against im-
proper placement procedures under the due process clause. The most 
common procedural due process requirement is that the individual 
be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before ad-
verse governmental action is taken against him.14-1 In some situations, 
such as criminal trials, due process requires more: the opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 145 the right to be rep-
resented by counsel (including assigned counsel if the individual is 
too poor to hire an attorney),146 and the right against self-incrimina-
tion.147 But not all of these procedural safeguards are constitutionally 
required in all proceedings;148 until relatively recently, most of them 
were available only in criminal proceedings.140 In addition to this 
criminal-civil dichotomy, the courts had also recognized a judicial-
administrative (or judicial-legislative) dichotomy, rather inflexibly 
refusing to sanction procedural safeguards in those proceedings la-
beled "civil," "administrative," or "legislative."150 
Today these mechanical distinctions have eroded, and the Su-
143. For the few interests that have been found to be compelling, see Marston v. 
Lewis, 41 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S., March 19, 1973) (integrity of voting process); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (life of mother and fetus); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944) (national security in time of war). See also Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 
185-87 (1970). 
144. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance 
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment); 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (taking custody of child from one parent and 
awarding it to other); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dis-
missal from employment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (contempt of court). 
145. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
146. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
147. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
148. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to trial by 
jury in juvenile delinquency proceedings); Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (no right to have attorney present at 
conference that could result in placement in a school for the maladjusted or in per-
manent suspension from school). 
149, For an explanation of the historical and functional considerations that in the 
past severely limited the application of due process standards to noncriminal areas, 
sec Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 
81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
150. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152 (1941); 
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
§ 7.03 (Supp. 1970). 
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preme Court has made it clear that where sufficiently important in-
terests are at stake or where the threatened adverse action is partic-
ularly harsh, certain due process safeguards must be applied.151 In 
general, what satisfies the requirements of due process in any given 
circumstance turns upon the nature of the proceedings involved and 
the interests, both governmental and private, affected by these pro-
ceedings. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in Hannah v. 
Larche: 152 
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are unde-
finable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts . 
. . . Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain 
in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The 
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, 
and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations 
which must be taken into account. 
Traditionally, fewer procedural safeguards have been required 
where children are involved because the state, out of its solicitude 
for the welfare of minors, did not want to subject them to the harsher 
adult processes. This argument, based on the time-worn concept of 
parens patriae,153 is now outmoded. In the landmark decision of In 
re Gault,154 the Supreme Court held that, in juvenile proceedings 
that may result in commitment to an institution, the child or his 
parents must be (1) given notice sufficient to permit preparation of 
a defense to the charges; (2) given notice of the child's right to be 
represented by counsel (including assigned counsel if the parents 
cannot afford to pay); and (3) afforded the right against self-incrimi-
nation and the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. The 
Court broke with tradition in extending these procedural rights, 
traditionally applied only in the criminal law area, to an area that 
had been previously classified as civil,155 thus discounting the crimi-
nal-civil and adult-child dichotomies.156 Of paramount concern to 
151. See notes 156-59 infra and accompanying text. 
152. 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
153. The doctrine of parens patriae, the cornerstone of the juvenile justice system 
of every state, is that the state, as a substitute parent, will act in the best interests 
of the child and will competently control and rear the child. See, e.g., Pee v. United 
States, 274 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary 
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 10. 
As one set of authorities has noted, "Because the state is supposed to proceed .•. 
as parens patriae and not as an adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the 
proceedings are 'civil' in nature and not criminal, and have asserted that the child 
cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases." 
0. KETCHAM & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS !U:LATING TO JUVENILE COURTS 257 
(1967). 
154. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
155. See 387 U.S. at 59-60 (Black, J., concurring). 
156. 387 U.S. at 16-27. 
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the Court were the practical consequences stemming from the ad-
judication of a minor as a juvenile delinquent, that is the possibility 
of incarceration for a period of years far in excess of the adult pen-
alty for the equivalent crime and the resultant stigmatization. 
Similarly, in Heryford v. Parker,151 a habeas corpus action 
brought by a mother on behalf of her mentally deficient son who 
had been committed to a state training school for the feebleminded 
and epileptic, the plaintiff, relying on Gault, alleged that the child 
had been denied his constitutional right to counsel and confronta-
tion at his commitment hearing. Attempting to distinguish Gault, 
the state argued that Gault was concerned with commitment for cor-
rection or rehabilitation of juveniles, while the present proceeding 
was concerned solely with commitment for teaching and training the 
mentally deficient.158 Dismissing the state's argument, the court of 
appeals stated, "The overriding consideration of the [Gault] court 
was that in either case the determination carried with it the 'awesome 
prospect of incarceration in a state institution.' "159 "\.Yhile rejecting 
the civil-criminal dichotomy and emphasizing the incarcerative con-
sequences of juvenile adjudications, the Heryford court also greatly 
reduced the use of the concept of parens patriae as an excuse for 
denying procedural rights.160 
These cases, which were greatly concerned with the stigmatiza-
tion attendant upon incarceration, indicate that a court may also 
view it as unreasonable to stigmatize children as mentally retarded 
without proper procedural safeguards. It is true that the juvenile 
delinquency cases involved physical incarceration, but it can be ar-
gued that there is an equivalent harm when a child is labeled men-
tally retarded in that he is involuntarily segregated, confined in a 
separate classroom, and locked into an inferior educational "track.'' 
Additionally, there is a figurative (but no less damaging) imprison-
ment of the child for the rest of his life within the world of the men-
tally retarded. 
The interests accorded due process protection in recent nonin-
carceration cases do not appear to be more important than those 
157. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). 
158. 396 F.2d at 395. 
159. 396 F.2d at 395. 
160. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or 
whetl1er tlie subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the 
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for 
a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training 
as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the 
constitutional safeguards of due process. Where, as in botli proceedings for juve-
niles and mentally deficient persons, tlie state undertakes to act in parens patriae, 
it has tlie inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and tliis necessarily includes 
the duty to see tliat a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings [sic] 
is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step 
of tlie proceedings • . . • 
396 F.2d at 396. 
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threatened by the retardation labeling-placement process. For ex-
ample, in Bell v. Burson,161 the Court found as violative of due pro-
cess a Georgia statute that required the suspension of a driver's li-
cense without a hearing where a driver who had been involved in an 
accident failed to post security for damages claimed by the injured 
party. And in Wisconsin v. Constantineau.,162 the Court upheld a 
challenge on due process grounds to a statute that authorized the 
public posting of the names of persons believed guilty of excessive 
drinking in order to prevent them from obtaining liquor. Since the 
statute made no provision for notice or hearing before posting, none 
was given. The Court held that the characterization of a person as 
an excessive drinker, though a mark of serious illness to some, is such 
a stigma or badge of disgrace to others that procedural due process re-
quires notice and an opportunity to be heard.163 Although there is 
no formula by which the interests infringed in each of these cases 
can be quantified and mathematically measured against the interests 
in the present situation, it seems that the interests involved in the 
mental retardation labeling process-the interest in equal educa-
tional opportunity, the interest in being free from arbitrary racial 
and economic discrimination, and the interest in freedom from un-
deserved stigmatization-are sufficient to bring them within the re-
cently expanded parameters of due process exemplified by these cases. 
In cases dealing specifically with education, lower courts have 
held that a state college or university student suspended for a sub-
stantial period has a right to a hearing,164 to be advised at the hear-
ing by counsel,10:, to examine adverse statements on which the charges 
against him are based,166 and to be provided with an oral or written 
report on the facts to which each witness testifies.167 In the area of 
secondary education, lower courts have found that due process re-
161. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
162. 400 U.S. 435 (1971). For other cases extending the due process hearing require• 
ments to noncriminal areas, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state replevin 
provisions); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of public assistance bene-
fits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment); 
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of license to 
practice law); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (alien deportation); 
Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (right to contract with the govern• 
ment); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (denial of retail liquor license). 
163. 400 U.S. at 437. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's em• 
ployment contract). Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
164. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
165. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
166. See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 648, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
167. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). There need be no stenographic or mechanical recording 
of the proceedings, however. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 402-03 
(N.D. Fla. 1963). 
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quires a hearing before a student can be expelled for any significant 
period;168 more specific requirements have not yet been spelled out.169 
An important common feature of the cases discussed above is that 
the hearings were deemed necessary in order to consider facts unique 
to the individual rather than facts determining general policy deci-
sions. The courts found that the first category of facts should not be 
determined without giving adversely affected individuals an oppor-
tunity to know and confront unfavorable evidence.170 Although the 
decision to use IQ tests may be a general policy matter, individual 
placement clearly involves facts unique to the individual that can 
most appropriately be determined at a hearing. 
There are interests that militate against requiring any hearings or 
full adversarial hearings in this setting. As previously discussed, the 
burden on the government must be balanced against the private in-
terest affected by governmental action.171 One obvious cost to the gov-
ernment is monetary expense. Moreover, there may be a diversion of 
a school's nonmonetary resources and energies to the hearing process. 
However, these costs have not been considered prohibitive in estab-
lishing hearing requirements for other educational decisions involv-
ing a small number of individuals with important personal interests. 
For example, schools have been required to hold hearings when dis-
charging some teachers172 and when expelling students.173 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has held that where the interest in reducing 
expenses is the principle justification for a denial of due process, that 
interest is not dispositive.174 
There are other important government interests involved in 
EMR placement. First, a formal hearing might destroy informal re-
lationships and set against one another people who are not truly ad-
versaries; in the EMR context, informal counseling, between school 
diagnosticians and educators on the one hand and the parents on the 
other, constitutes an important aspect of the placement process. Im-
plicit in this argument is the assumption that in most cases the diag-
nostician is making a proper determination that the child is retarded 
and is advising the parents on that basis. This may not be true with 
respect to minority group children. Since they populate the ranks of 
168. Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); See Jackson v. Domer, 
424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 
CASE W. R.Es. L. REv. 378, 393-94 (1969); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary 
Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 358, 359 (1971). 
169. See Comment, supra note 168, at 362-68. 
170. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISI"RATIVE LAW TEXT§ 7.03 (3d ed. 1972). 
171. See text accompanying note 152 supra. 
172. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564 (1972) (dictum). 
173. See, e.g., Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). 
174. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
261 (1970), quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 889-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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the nation's EMR classes out of proportion to their number in the 
population as a whole,175 it may be fair to infer that diagnosticians 
have been wrong in a substantial number of cases involving minority 
children.176 Hearings may strengthen the fact-finding process by en-
couraging clinicians to make a more considered initial diagnosis and 
to place less reliance on tests and techniques that have not been vali-
dated with respect to minority group children. 
A second concern is that the availability of formal proceedings 
might discourage special education personnel from making any but 
the most obvious placement decisions for fear of a professionally em-
barrassing reversal at a hearing. This risk seems far less serious than 
the harm that could be caused by misplacement. 
A third concern is that the hearing process may cause an atrophy 
of internal educational initiative in vital areas. If left to their own 
devices, it has been argued, special education administrators, who 
best know both the needs of the children and the resources of the 
system, would eventually do a better job than the courts. In Gold-
berg v. Kelly,117 the dissenters raised a similar argument that the 
Court should not act because the administrative agency involved was 
about to issue a ruling that would adequately meet the needs of all 
parties.178 But, as one commentator has pointed out, the agency 
dragged its feet on promulgation of the rule for several months and 
did not seem committed to the remedial procedures.170 Special educa-
tors also have moved slowly in changing placement practices even 
after the legal problems have been made clear. For example, an EMR 
placement suit recently reopened in California alleges that a school 
district is not following court-ordered EMR hearing procedures.180 In 
another example, special educators in Arizona continued to admin-
ister IQ tests written solely in English to Guadalupe Indian children, 
who spoke little or no English, months after a case challenging similar 
practices toward Mexican-American children was first instituted in 
California,181 despite the wide publicity that the case received in 
175. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. 
176. There is other support for this conclusion. A study of 378 eleven-year-old 
children in EMR classes in the Philadelphia area, which used multiple criteria in the 
evaluative process, indicated that 25 per cent were misplaced. Garrison & Hammill, 
supra note 47, at 19. 
177. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
178. 397 U.S. at 282-83. The proposed HEW regulation was, in fact, more generous 
than the Court's mandate in certain respects. It assured that welfare payments would 
continue until a statutory fair hearing took place, and the regulation's hearing in-
cluded certain safeguards not demanded by the Court. 
179. Christensen, Of Prior Hearings and Welfare as "New Property," 3 CLEARING· 
HOUSE REV. 321, 336 (1970). 
180. Joint Response of Plaintiffs and Defendants to Notice of Call of the General 
List and Order, Oct. 31, 1972, Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP 
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972). 
181. Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 1970, 
reopened Oct. 31, 1972). See note 58 supra. 
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educational literature and despite the obvious unfairness of the test-
ing procedure. Only after court review was sought in Arizona did the 
practice finally end.182 Thus, recent experience belies any optimism 
that the self-improving impulses of the administrative process will 
create procedural safeguards in the area of special education without 
court review. 
Because the students' interests seem to outweigh the disadvan-
tages to the school system of holding a hearing, it seems probable 
that procedural protections will be required for minority children 
facing placement into EMR classes. To say that the due process 
clause is applicable, however, does not necessarily mean that a full 
trial-type hearing is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court 
generally requires that the affected individual be provided, at the 
minimum, with a "meaningful" opportunity to have the crucial is-
sue heard. In judging the adequacy of procedures, the courts con-
sider "[t]he precise nature of the interest that has been adversely af-
fected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, 
the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, ... and 
the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished .... "183 
The essential and unanswered question is how much "process" is 
"due" -when and how elaborate must the hearing be. 
With regard to the question of timing, there seems to be almost 
a general presumption that one who is constitutionally entitled to be 
heard should be heard before a drastic change in status occurs.184 
Exception is made in those emergency situations where immediate 
action is required.185 In the present context, to the extent that a de-
lay engendered by a hearing keeps the suspected mentally retarded 
child in the regular classroom, whatever effect his presence has in 
slowing down the "regular" children for this additional period of 
time is likely to be negligible. Therefore, there is no emergency pres-
ent in the EMR labeling-placement context, and a hearing before 
transfer to an EMR class is appropriate. 
Assuming for the moment that an adversary hearing is required 
at some point before EMR placement, it must be determined 
whether an adversary hearing is constitutionally required prior to 
the administration of an IQ test in order to determine if there 
exists sufficient evidence to warrant the administering of the test to 
a particular child. There is strong evidence that once a child is 
tested and scores in the EMR range, the regular teacher, aware of 
182. Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dist. No. 3, Civil 
No. 71-435-Phx (D. Ariz., Jan. 25, 1972). See note 58 supra. 
183. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). 
184. See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); 
Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 199 (1933). 
185. See, e.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) 
(action allowed before constitutionally required hearing where food was about to spoil). 
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his supposed handicap, tends to treat him accordingly, even if he is 
not placed into an EMR class.186 On balance, however, this harm is 
not sufficient to justify the requirement of an adversary hearing at 
this point. Such a requirement would result in the novelty of two 
full hearings; even in the area of criminal law, where the strictest 
due process safeguards are required, there is no requirement of an 
adversary hearing on the question of whether or not the state may 
employ a particular investigative measure in a criminal case. 
In the criminal law field, however, due process does require a 
nonadversarial review of the existing evidence by an impartial tri-
bunal before the police and prosecutorial authorities may engage in 
certain "drastic" evidence-gathering measures, such as a physical 
search of premises or wiretapping. The existing evidence must dem-
onstrate that there is "probable cause" to believe that the evidence 
sought will be found at the place to be searched or "bugged."187 With 
respect to regulatory searches, such as fire, health, or safety inspec-
tions, strict "probable cause" is not required, but some evidence 
short of this must be reviewed by an impartial tribunal before such 
a search may be conducted.188 
It is possible that an analogy can be drawn between the criminal 
investigative process of a search and the EMR diagnostic process of 
IQ testing; both are "searches" that involve inherent dangers. It can 
thus be argued that if due process requires a nonadversarial review 
of the existing evidence by an impartial tribunal before authorities 
can engage in the former search, then due process should require 
the same procedure for the analogous latter search. The pre-IQ test-
ing evidence in the EMR setting is the data derived from personality 
tests, social adjustment tests, medical examinations, family back-
ground examinations, and personal observations by the diagnosti-
cian. The standard for granting permission to administer an IQ 
test could be something less than "probable cause" (the standard 
used in fire, health, and safety inspections). The impartial reviewing 
body could be the same one that reviews the actual placement de-
cision. As in a criminal search case, the hearing need not be a full-
blown adversarial trial. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the requirement that police 
authorities apply for a search warrant derives from the fourth 
amendment, which "secures" persons "against unreasonable searches 
and seizures" and provides, in effect, that a search or seizure is un-
reasonable unless conducted upon a warrant based upon "probable 
cause" and obtained from a judicial officer who reviews the existing 
186. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. 
187. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wire-tapping); United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (physical search). 
188. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 
387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
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evidence.189 Nevertheless, Goldberg v. Kelly190 lends support to the 
proposition that the due process clause may require more than one 
type of hearing in a noncriminal context. In Kelly, regulations of an 
administrative agency (HEW) required a hearing after welfare bene-
fits had been terminated. The Court held that a hearing must be 
held before the benefits could be terminated and thus in effect re-
quired a due process hearing before and a statutory hearing after 
termination. The court stated, however, that the preliminary hear-
ing was required only if benefits were terminated prior to a hear-
ing.101 
In the welfare cases harm to the individual can be avoided by 
delaying termination of benefits. Therefore, only one hearing need 
be required. In the EMR situation, however, harm may result solely 
from the administration of the IQ test, because the regular teacher, 
if aware of the student's low score, may treat him differently. Be-
cause of this initial, unavoidable harm it could be argued that Kelly 
and the criminal cases require two hearings in this situation, the 
first to be of the limited, nonadversarial type. 
Since the due process safeguards that may be required before 
an IQ test is given have been examined, the remaining question is 
what safeguards are constitutionally mandated in the hearing re-
quired prior to placement. As a norm for this determination, the 
safeguards outlined by the Supreme Court for the pretermination 
hearing required in Kelly will be examined. The welfare hearing is 
chosen as a model because in this area the Supreme Court has ex-
tensively cataloged the due process requirements in a specific, civil 
context. 
The first consideration is notice of the impending EMR place-
ment. In dealing with welfare termination, the Supreme Court found 
that seven days' notice was sufficient, "although there may be cases 
where fairness would require that a longer time be given."192 A wel-
fare recipient is likely to have most of the rebutting evidence readily 
at hand; the recipient himself would be the source of most of it. In 
the EMR placement context, however, the typical parent will have 
no familiarity with the type of evidence needed to contest the place-
ment decision, nor would such evidence be readily available. A pe-
riod of notice greater than seven days, it seems, could be required. 
As to form of notice, both a letter and personal conference with 
a school official should be required. The parent of a minority child 
threatened with EMR placement, like a welfare recipient, is likely 
189. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
190. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
191. 397 U.S. at 267. If the termination were delayed until after the statutory 
hearing, then the preliminary hearing would not have been required. 397 U.S. at 267 
n.14. 
192. 397 U.S. at 268. 
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to suffer from poor education and a lack of awareness. As the Su-
preme Court recognized in Kelly, the combination of a letter and 
conference "is probably the most effective method of communicat-
ing" with such persons.193 
The right to counsel in the welfare context was limited to a right 
to be represented if the individual chose to retain counsel.104 Since 
the Supreme Court has never extended the right to appointed coun-
sel to a situation where physical incarceration was not a possibility,196 
due process probably does not require a right to appointed counsel 
in the EMR hearing, despite the figurative incarceration involved 
in EMR placement. 
Due process might demand, as in Kelly,196 that the parents have 
a right to a personal apearance to state their position, rather than 
being limited to written submissions. As the Court recognized in 
Kelly, "[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most re-
cipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to ·write 
effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance."197 More-
over, the parents should, possibly, have the right to bring in the 
child, for the child himself will often be the best evidence that he is 
not retarded. 
The requirement of an impartial hearing officer or body is the 
very essence of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This principle 
is easier to state than apply, however, and three alternatives readily 
present themselves. One would require a court to be the hearing 
body.198 The second would require the school authorities to employ 
a hearing officer or officers whose sole function is to decide contested 
EMR placement cases.199 The third would allow the school authori-
ties to choose competent hearing officers from among school per-
sonnel who are as far removed from the case as possible.200 
The Court intimated in Kelly that not every prior involvement 
with the case would disqualify an individual from hearing a con-
tested welfare case.201 Such language notwithstanding, it could be 
argued that regular school employees should have no part in the 
193. 397 U.S. at 268. 
194. 397 U.S. at 270. 
195. See K. DAVIS, supra note 170, § 8.08, at 205-06. 
196. 397 U.S. at 269. 
197. 397 U.S. at 269. 
198. Cf. State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wash. 2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969). 
199. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 11, 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1970). 
200. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 
807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967). 
201. The Court in Kelly found that the hearing body should be impartial but 
refused to apply a rigid rule of separation of functions that would disqualify every 
member of the agency staff who had some prior involvement with the case. 397 U.S. 
at 271. 
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hearing process. Justice Jackson once observed, "Men are ... often 
bribed by their loyalties and ambitions . . . ."202 Regular school 
personnel have vested interests in such matters as the validity and 
efficiency of the testing program. Moreover, they must continue to 
maintain retarded classes in order to receive the school district's share 
of special funds for the handicapped. School personnel may also feel 
an obligation to the "normal" or "fast" students; they might not 
want to simplify the course content so as to enable the "slow" chil-
dren to learn. 203 · 
Although specially employed hearing officers would be less likely 
to be biased than regular school personnel, given the potential harm 
involved from misplacement it is submitted that due process might 
permit such special personnel to serve only at the hearings prelimi-
nary to giving an IQ test. Hearing officers, who would doubtless be 
psychologists or special educators, may be subject to bias in that they 
might hope to move from that position to a higher one within the 
school system. Therefore, only an outside tribunal could meet a 
stringent standard of impartiality. But Kelly, which dealt with an 
area of governmental disbursement that has been closely scrutinized 
by the Supreme Court,204 did not impose these more stringent hear-
ing requirements, so their application to the EMR setting may be 
found to be unwarranted. 
As to a right of discovery, the Court was not very explicit in 
Kelly, although it did cite language from an earlier case that required 
disclosure.205 In the EMR setting this may mean that due process 
requires that the parents or their representatives have an opportunity 
to examine all documents and records prior to the hearing, as well 
as during its course. Without such an opportunity, in many instances 
the presentation of the child's case could be so hampered as to make 
the hearing almost meaningless. 
In Kelly it was held that the welfare recipient had a right to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses.200 A recent Supreme Court 
decision, however, has held that the denial of a claim on the basis of 
reports by physicians who have examined a claimant for social secu-
rity disability benefits will be upheld notwithstanding the absence of 
202. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 103 (1951). 
203. In addition, as the court recognized in Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 
3ll F. Supp. 501, 519-20 (C.D. Cal. 1970), "evidence shows that at least at some schools 
there is a tendency among some ••• school personnel to assume that Negro students, 
particularly Negroes of poor socio-economic backgrounds, will achieve poorly and to 
make low assignments accordingly." 
204. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969). 
205. 397 U.S. at 270, citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). 
206. 397 U.S. at 271. The Court did not appear to require a verbatim transcript 
of testimony. 
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cross-examination.207 This case may be distinguished from the instant 
situation because the Court relied on the fact that the claimant 
had a right under the Social Security Act208 to subpoena the phy-
sicians who made the reports but had failed to do so within the 
prescribed time. 209 In the EMR context, cross-examination gives 
the parent and child the opportunity to contest the diagnosis in a 
meaningful way. 
Finally, the Court in Kelly required that the decision maker state 
the reasons for this determination and indicate the evidence on which 
he relied; his statement did not, however, need to "amount to a full 
opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law."210 
This requirement should also apply to EMR proceedings. 
The foregoing discussion of a child's right to a hearing before 
placement into an EMR class has been predicated upon the assump-
tion that commitment to EMR classes in a particular school system 
is involuntary. However, when the process of commitment is volun-
tary-that is, based upon parental consent-the traditional reasons 
for the due process safeguard of a hearing seem to vanish. 
However, in many cases the "consent" of the parent or guardian 
may not be fully informed or meaningful.211 Although some educa-
tional systems undoubtedly require a school official to attempt to 
explain the import of the decision to place the child in the retarded 
class, it is questionable whether many parents or guardians have the 
education or perception to comprehend the immediate and long-
range implications of this decision. Second, even in those systems 
where an explanation is required before consent, the official charged 
with this task might not divulge the kind of exhaustive, objective 
data needed by the parent in order to make a knowledgeable deci-
sion. Third, even where some explanation is required, it might be 
given only after the school authorities have concluded from IQ 
scores and other factors that the child is in fact retarded and should 
be placed in the retarded class. Given the awe with which many poor 
and minority parents view school authorities, their limited educa-
tion, and the language difficulties especially present when dealing 
207. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). 
208. Social Security Act § 205(d), 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1970). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.926 
(1972). 
209. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971). 
210. 397 U.S. at 271. 
211. In dealing with guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has stated: "[T]o be valid 
such a waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the 
statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments there-
under, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all 
other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.'' Von Moltke v. 
Gilles, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1947). This standard probably applies to waivers of consent 
in noncriminal cases. See, e.g., Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (Black-
mun, J.), 188-89 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1971). 
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with Mexican-American parents, grave doubts exist as to whether a 
knowledgeable and meaningful consent can really be given even 
after an explanation. 
If consent is required for the placement of children into EMR 
classes, and the parents later contest that consent in court on the 
ground that it was not knowingly and intelligently given, the burden 
of proof might shift to the school authorities to demonstrate the 
constitutionality of the consent. Precedent is found in Swarb v. 
Lennox,212 where the court considered a study that implied that 
ninety-six per cent of the persons who had signed consumer con-
tracts containing confession-of-judgment clauses had incomes under 
$10,000. Because of this study, the court shifted the burden of proof 
to the creditors to demonstrate that this class of consumers under-
stood that such clauses waived their constitutional right to a trial 
and authorized their alleged creditors to "confess" the alleged debt.213 
Taking the consent issue even further, an argument can be 
made in the instant case that the interests of the parent or guardian 
may be entirely different from the interests of the minor child and 
that due process, therefore, requires an evaluation of the necessity 
of making the stigmatizing placement decision independent of pa-
rental consent. One example of how the interests of the child and 
parent may diverge is the parent's possible interpretation of the 
child's failure to perform well in school as a failure on his part as 
a parent. Such a parent may very well wish to have his child officially 
labeled mentally retarded because this labeling relieves the parent 
of his own guilt feelings; it transfers the "blame" to the child or to 
fate. The parent may also have an interest adverse to that of the 
child in a situation where the school authorities exert considerable 
pressure, either overtly or covertly, to compel the parent to consent 
to the placement for "the best interest of the child." The child has 
an interest in an uncoerced and informed decision, while the parent 
-though he may rationalize his consent as in the child's best interest 
-may be primarily concerned with cooperating with school officials 
who, to the parents, are authority figures. 
Similar considerations have led to the recognition of parental 
inability to represent the child in another area of the law. Where the 
child has a cause of action for personal injury, selfish concerns may 
motivate a parent to accept a settlement. Therefore, the court will 
not allow the parent to serve as the child's representative in handling 
the claim.214 
The final stage in the commitment process at which procedural 
safeguards may come into play occurs after a child has actually been 
212. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afjd. on other grounds, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). 
213. 314 F. Supp. at 1100-01. 
214. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Rainey, 292 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). 
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placed into an EMR class. Because of the unreliability of methods 
used to determine mental retardation and because of the importance 
of the individual interests involved, the minimum that due process 
may require is periodic review of the initial placement decision. In 
Mills v. Board of Education216 a federal district court so held. 
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTION 
Although it is often stated that bias cannot be eliminated from 
IQ tests,216 there are practical ways to minimize their unreliability 
and thus meet possible constitutional objections to their use. For 
example, a court could, without impairing an EMR placement pro-
cess, require that (I) whatever tests are given be administered in 
the child's primary language; (2) future tests be developed so as to 
minimize bias; (3) examiners of the child's race be used; (4) children 
who score higher than two standard deviations below the given test's 
norm not be placed into EMR classes unless there is cultural and 
adaptive behavior to supplement the test results; (5) before any place-
ment of a minority child occurs because of low test scores there be an 
examination of the child's developmental history, cultural back-
ground and scholastic achievement; (6) there be a nonadversarial 
hearing before test administration and an adversarial hearing before 
placement; (7) parents consent to the placement in writing, and the 
nature of their consent be a subject of inquiry at the adversarial hear-
ing; (8) there be an annual review of the capabilities of children 
placed into EMR classes. In fact, California has already adopted217 
and Michigan is in the process of adopting218 similar schemes. Al-
though not a panacea, these procedures, in due process terms, are 
reasonably related to proving the appropriateness of EMR placement 
for a minority child; in equal protection terms, these procedures are 
the most precise and least onerous means of placement. They do not 
institutionalize the misplacement of minority children as do the 
current procedures, and, moreover, they furnish minimum proce-
dural safeguards. 
215. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
216. See, e.g., Charters, Social Class and Intelligence Tests, in SCHOOL CHILDREN IN 
THE URBAN SLUMS 75 a. Roberts ed. 1967); Levine, Aptitude Versus Achievement, 18 
Eouc. &: PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 517, 517-19 (1958). 
217. CAL. Eouc. CODE §§ 6902.06-.095 (West Supp. 1973). For an application of such a 
scheme, see Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal., Feb. 5, 
1970, reopened Oct. 31, 1972). 
218. See Mich. State Bd. of Educ. Proposed Code for Special Educ. Programs &: 
Services (Draft No. 1, March 13-14, 1973) (formulated under authority conferred by 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 340.10, .252b, .298c, .317a, .318a, .60lb, .613, .772a, .77'Ja 
(Supp. 1973)). 
